

State of Ransomware in SA

The true impact on businesses in SA



State of

Ransomware in SA





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Agenda


- Ransomware Trends
- Survey Results
- Prevent & Mitigate
- Systemic & criminology response





Public Shaming










Know your enemy...











Public Shaming







Online negotiations



CONTI Recovery service

Hello. I have come to the chat and have full authority to negotiate from my manager. What do we need to do to get our data back? Can you help?

15 days ago



Please, introduce yourself (Company name and your position) and we'll provide all necessary information.

Sometimes our staff is busy, but we will reply as soon as possible.

Be in touch, thank you



14 days ago

l am a IT lead technician with ExaGrid Systems.



As you already know, we infiltrated your network and stayed in it for more than a month(enough to study all your documentation), encrypted your file servers, sql servers, downloaded all important information with a total weight of more than 800 GB: personal data of clients (home addresses, SSN phone numbers of the contract), employees (SSN, home addresses, employment contracts, scans of personal documents, phone numbers), contracts with partners, NDA forms, customer bases, consolidated financial statements, payroll, tax returns, settlements with partners, bank statements, source code and etc. The good news is that we are businessmen. We want to receive ransom for everything that needs to be kept secret, and don't want to ruin your business

The amount at which we are ready to meet you and keep everything as collateral is \$ 7,480,000.

14 days ago





Online negotiations



We are ready to accept \$2.6M





Okay, we will set up a call with the board members to get them to agree to the \$2.6M. It will take an hour or two to get them together. Once we get approval we will start the fund transfer process.













Our BTC wallet is 1JWnZmkJwJSK6F21nypCAGzsR6TVhPRA4P

Hello. We are preparing to send the payment shortly. Please confirm that this is the correct BTC wallet. 1JWnZmkJwJSK6F21nypCAGzsR6TVhPRA4P



Hello. Can you confirm before we send it? We don't want it to go to the wrong address. Thanks! 6 days ago







Our BTC wallet is 1JWnZmkJwJSK6F21nypCAGzsR6TVhPRA4P

5 days ago

Good Morning. Thank you for confirming. We will be sending the payment shortly. Please let me know when you receive it.





Payment received. We will now prepare everything you need.










Ransomware Ecosystem




- Run like a business with CEOs, incentives, partners (affiliates)
- FBI tracked 100 different ransomware strains
- Focus on different sectors and regions?





Players and Victims










Victimology and Targetting



- Conti
- · REvil
- Avaddor
- DopePayme
- Locality








Victimology and Targetting





- Conti
- Avadelon
- REVE
- ExpoPsyme







Malware: any software that has been designed to operate in a malicious, undesirable manner, without the informed consent of the computer owner or user.



Ransom: a consideration paid or demanded for the release of someone or something from captivity¹.



Ransomware: malware that holds the data of a computer user for ransom.



Big game hunting: a targeted ransomware operation that involves infiltrating large corporate or government networks that will be significant and lucrative.



Extortion: is the act or practice of wresting anything from a person by force, duress, menace, authority².








Cy-X is a form of computer crime in which the security of a corporate digital asset (Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability) is compromised and exploited in a threat of some form to extort a payment.




Ransomware 2.0






Ransomware 2.0





There is something of an unexpressed complicity: between the pirates, who threaten liberty but by and large not the lives of crews and maintain their ransom demands at levels which the industry can tolerate; the world of commerce, which has introduced precautions but advocates the freedom to meet the realities of the situation by the use of ransom payments; and the world of government, which stops short of deploring the payment ransom but stands aloof, participates in naval operations but on the whole is unwilling to combat pirates with force







Downtime direct impact on SA economy

SA's advanced economy has sectors highly cyber dependent

Reduced confidence in South Africa as the gateway to Africa

As developed economies clamp down, more attention to African organisations




Agenda

- Ransomware Trends
- Survey Results
 - Prevent & Mitigate
 - Systemic & criminology response










Concern

On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very concerned) how concerned are you about ransomware?





Poll Question


If attacked, would your company pay the ransom?

- No
- It's complicated and depends on the impact on business
- I don't know
- Yes, paying will cost less
- Yes our cyber insurance covers ransoms

All answers are anonymous

Pay: Yay or Nay?


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Pay: Yay or Nay?

If attacked, would your company pay the ransom?








Prepared?

How well prepared is your organization for a ransomware attack?




Poll Question

Have you suffered a ransomware attack in the past?

- Yes encryption only
- Yes, double extortion (exfiltration of data, encryption)
- Yes exfiltration of data only
- Yes all of the above plus DDOS
- No
- I don't want to answer this


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
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


Industry Breakdown

How well prepared is your organization for a ransomware attack?










Industry Breakdown


How well prepared is your organization for a ransomware attack?









Have you suffered a ransomware attack in the past?











Insurance

Does your cyber insurance cover your organisation against ransomware?



Business Impact


On a scale of 1-5 how drastic was the impact to your business?







Financial Impact







Remediation Costs Kn⊕wBe4 Source: Sophos "The State of Ransomware 2021"

Remediation costs vary based on your location

Czech Republic [30] \$0.37

Looking at the ransomware remediation costs at a country level, we see considerable variations.








What kind of attack(s) did you experience?











How did you respond? ITWeb and KnowBe4 Ransomware Survey -September 2021

How did you respond?




Countermeasures

On a scale of 1-5, what countermeasures do you feel are most effective in stopping ransomware?










Root cause that allowed the ransomware to gain initial foothold access into your environment?



Top Initial Root causes



Report Name	Social Engineering	RDP	Unpatched Software	Password Guessing	Credential Theft	Remote Server Attack	Third Party	USB	Other
Coveware Report	30%	45%	18%	-	-	-	-	-	5%
Statista	54%	20%			10%		-	-	-
Forbes Magazine Article	1st	3rd	2nd					-	-
Datto's Report	54%	20%	-	21%	10%	-	-	-	-
Hiscox Cyber Readiness	65%	-	28%	19%	39%	-	34%	2	-
Sophos Report	45%	9%	-		-	21%	9%	7%	9%
Averages	50%	24%	23%	20%	20%	21%	22%	7%	7%

- 1. Social Engineering
- 2. RDP
- 3. Unpatched Software
- 4. Password / Credentials

Source: Root causes of Ransomware by Roger Grimes 2021





Agenda

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Know your enemy...







Compromised Redirect Infrastructure

Real C2 Infrastructure

Hours to Weeks

StealBIT

7-Zip


WinSCP


Extortion Site

Minutes at.exe net.exe nitest.exe Phishing schtasks.exe winRM.exe Web Shell or Loader Credential Stuffing/Re-use RDP Entry Point

Initial Access

Exploitation



























Cover tracks: remove or roll over logs



Days to Months

Publish stolen files to extortion site



Expanded extortion ecosystem



Sell stolen data

Extortion

Remote control: RDP, TeamViewer, AnyDesk, Splashtop, Atera, ScreenConnect

Reconnaissance & Lateral Movement

LOLBins

Deployment Exfiltration





Defending Against Ransomware Advisory





Defending Against Ransomware

An Advisory by the South African Cybersecurity Hub



Authors: Charl van der Walt, Anna Colland. Roger A. Grimes & Dr. Kiny Pillay.

Date published: September 2021

Orange Cyberdefense KnowBe4




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Orange Cyberdefense KnowBe4









Anticipate & Identify

- **Anticipate** the threat
- Know Your Adversary
- Know Yourself
 - Table-top and technical simulation exercises
 - Asset discovery
 - Internet attack surface
 - Check for weak passwords
 - Patch local privilege escalation vulnerabilities
 - Perform scans / searches on relevant vulnerabilities

RESPO

FRAMEWORK

Regular **pen tests**



Protect

- Document & test IRP
- Security Awareness & Culture
- Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR)

RESPO

FRAMEWORK

- Strong authentication
- Security Hygiene Practices
 - Enforce least privilege
 - Backup & Retention Policy (3-2-1 Rule)





Detect



- EDR
- Network Threat Detection
- Detect & prevent phishing
- Deception technology (Canaries)





Respond

- Stay calm
- Disconnect
- Determine **scope**
- Keep people informed
- Don't pay (if you can)





Recover

- Establish a trustworthy beachhead
- Recovery is a marathon










Good Resources







https://orangecyberdefense.com/global/white-papers/beating-ransomware/ https://info.knowbe4.com/ransomware-hostage-rescue-manual-0





- Extortion Attacks are here to stay
- It's a crime not a technology
- Defense in Depth
- Plan for the worst...



Agenda

- Why extortion happens
- A systemic response
- A criminological response






If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don't understand the problems and you don't understand the technology.

BRUCE SCHNEIER

Orange Cyberdefense



It could be argued that the elements of our model broadly pit the real-life context of the criminal against the deeprooted security debt that has accumulated in our technology stacks as we have rushed over the past three decades towards an everything digital / everything online society. All of this perpetuated by skewed economic drivers and political ambivalence

Increased Impact

Reducing the Ransomware threat – Comprehensive Response

Offender

Demotivate offenders:

- Coordinated law enforcement effort
- Reducing the flow of funds from victims
- Targeted efforts to reduce criminals' neutralization techniques

Get suitable guardians in place:

- Appreciate the limited potential of security technologies in the complexity of cyberspace
- Use the power of community in partnership with security service providers and law enforcement

Decrease attractiveness as victim:

- Decreasing vulnerability
- Decreasing the value of digital assets
- Create inertia with Encryption, DRM and honeytokens
- Decreasing visibility & reducing attack surface
- Agile detection and response

Thank you & Questions?

Please get in touch:



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